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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaint if f /Appelllee, 
v. 
JAMES R. WHITEHEAD, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20001150-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS T 
This is an appeal from a conviction for one count of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the casfe pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (e) (1996) . 
STATEMENT 'OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Was the evidence of defendant's recklessness in discharging 
a loaded semiautomatic handgun in close proximity to three other 
persons sufficient to su|stain his conviction for aggravated 
assault? 
A criminal conviction will be reversed for insufficient 
evidence only when the 
inherently improbable 
evidence is "so inconclusive or so 
tjiat 'reasonable minds must have 
1 
entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed t 
crime." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994)(quoti 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superceded on 
other grounds, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103, governing aggravated assault, 
provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits 
assault . . . and he: 
(b). . . uses a dangerous weapon . . . or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103(1) (b) (1999) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103, providing definitions for 
culpable mental states, provides in pertinent part: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(3) (1999) . 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
so. Dy information with one count of 
•3). After a trial by jury, he was 
71). The trial court sentenced 
term of zero-to-five years in the Utah 
iths on probation (R. 75). The court 
also imposed 3 0 days of Home confinement, 75 hours of community 
service, and a fine of $2500, of which $1500 was suspended (Id.). 
The court ordered Adult Probation and Parole to determine the 
amount of restitution (Id.). This timely appeal followed (R. 
Defendant was charge 
aggravated assault (R. 2 
convicted as charged (R. 
defendant to a suspended 
State Prison, with 36 morl 
76) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
parked his truck at Mr. 
and the victim, Lindsay 
parked nearby (R. 90: 2 61 
Just before 10 o'clock on an August evening, defendant had 
Billiards, a pool hall, when Nichol Vigil 
Moore, pulled into the parking lot and 
, 57, 136). Nichol recognized 
defendant's truck and went over to talk with him (Id. at 41, 57) . 
Lindsay, who did not personally know defendant, accompanied 
Nichol and waited while the two conversed (Id. at 43). 
Defendant had the driver's door open and was sitting on the 
bottom ledge of the door frame (Id. at 28, 143). When Nichol 
approached and began talking, he put his arms around her waist 
and they "cuddled up," nis stomach to her back (Id. at 29, 42, 
i 138, 142). Lindsay stopd a few feet away, leaning her shoulder 
3 
against the side of the truck (Id. at 33, 43, 141) . A friend of 
defendant's called Mike stood on a nearby curb (Id. at 29, 57). 
The conversation between Nichol and defendant focused on 
Nicholas ex-boyfriend (Id. at 57-58, 142-43). Nichol, upset 
about the break-up, said something about wanting to hurt him (Id. 
at 58). Defendant responded by taking a gun out from under the 
seat of his truck and commenting that he felt safe (Id. at 60, 
143). Defendant testified, "I asked her if she wanted to learn 
how to shoot and if that would make her feel safe" (Id. at 143). 
Defendant, who had been around guns his whole life and who 
professed to be well-trained in gun safety, further testified 
that because the gun felt top-heavy when he picked it up, he knew 
it was loaded (Id. at 149-50, 151). 'Defendant removed the 
magazine and then offered the gun to Nichol to see if it "would 
fit her hand" (Id. at 143). She refused to take it, saying she 
did not want to be around a gun (Id.). Defendant pulled the 
slide back, and a bullet dropped out and rolled on the ground 
(Id. at 31, 45, 60, 61, 152). He retrieved it, put it in the 
magazine, and replaced the magazine in the handgun (Id. at 32, 
62, 143) . 
Nichol testified that defendant was "playing with" the gun 
(Id. at 59). She stated that when he "started fooling with the 
gun," she moved away (Id. at 62, 63, 68). Lindsay was still 
standing by, waiting for the conversation to end (Id. at 33, 43). 
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reinserted the magazine, 
32, 153). He pulled it 
Apparently thinking the 
forward again (Id. at 15) 
Lindsay testified that she became uncomfortable with defendant's 
conduct and that, u[a]t the point that he had put the clip back 
m there, it was apparent that, you know, he wasn't funny, wasn't 
[sic] being macho and I \. . . turn[ed] to walk away around the 
back of his truck" (IcL. kt 47). 
According to both Lfmdsay and defendant, when defendant 
the slide was already forward (Id. at 
back to see if the gun was loaded, 
[gun was not loaded, he let the slide go 
3-54, 158). He then turned his upper 
body to his side, pomtefd the gun downwards in Lindsay's general 
direction, and tried to decock the weapon with one hand by 
pulling the trigger and lowering the'hammer (Id. at 34, 46, 63, 
154). The hammer, however, slipped out of his thumb and the gun, 
which was loaded, fired (Id. at 144) . 
The bullet from defendant's gun entered Lindsay's leg about 
three inches above the knee cap, splitting her femur and breaking 
off another chunk of bone (Id. at 36-37). Surgery was required 
to remove the bullet and insert a 4-inch pin in her leg (Id. at 
Je to walk for 2M months and had still not 
motion in her leg at the time of trial 
37) . Lindsay was unabl|
regained full flex and 
some ten months later (Id. at 37, 53) . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The only issue in this case is whether the evidence sufficed 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted 
recklessly in pulling the trigger on his loaded handgun while 
pointing it in the general direction of the victim, who had been 
standing in the same place for at least ten minutes. When the 
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, with all determinations of credibility and the weight of 
the evidence left to the trier of fact, the evidence plainly 
sufficed to allow the jury to conclude that defendant's conduct 
was reckless. 
First, the record contains competent evidence that defendant 
knew of the risks inherent in handling a deadly weapon. He had 
been around guns all his life, had taken gun safety courses, and 
knew the safety rules as well as the details of how his gun 
operated. More specifically, he knew that guns should not be 
carried around loaded, and he knew how to properly decock a 
loaded gun. Second, the evidence demonstrates that defendant 
consciously disregarded the risks by, first, carrying a loaded 
gun in his truck for no apparent reason and, second, by reloading 
the gun and then attempting to decock it using a method 
disfavored by gun safety professionals. Finally, defendant's 
actions grossly violated the very essence of the three 
fundamental gun safety rules which together embody the Utah 
6 
standard of care for the 
had sufficient evidence before it to support a conclusion of 
recklessness and where del 
to second-guess the jury' 
should be affirmed. 
safe handling of guns. Where the jury 
fendant has offered no persuasive reason 
s determination, defendant's conviction 
ARGUMENT 
WHEN VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S VERDICT, 
THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S 
RECKLESSNESS IN DISCHARGING A 
LOADED SEMIAUTOMATIC HANDGUN IN 
CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THREE OTHER 
PERSONS IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
HIS CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT 
The gist of defendant's argument is that the facts adduced 
at trial do not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
discharged his loaded gun with a reckless mental state. Br. of 
App. at 7, 11. Specifically, he argues that his conduct did not 
constitute an extreme deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise. See Br. of App. at 11 (citing 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(3) (1999)) . Defendant highlights his 
attempt to decock the gun as evidence negating any recklessness 
on his part and further 
of gun safety with only 
(argues that he followed the basic rules 
"minor deviations." Id. at 12-13, 15-17 
For these reasons, he asserts his conviction should be reversed. 
When presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, "the function!of a reviewing court is limited to 
7 
insuring [sic] that there is sufficient competent evidence as to 
each element of the charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime." State 
v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991) . The reviewing court 
does not "sit as a second trier of fact." State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 
30, % 16, 418 Utah Adv. Rep. 8. Rather, it leaves to the 
exclusive province of the jury all determinations bearing on the 
weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). Thus, w[w]here 
there is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can 
be drawn from it, from which findings of all the elements of the 
crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, [the reviewing 
court's] inquiry is complete" and the verdict is sustained. 
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989). 
In order to establish a reckless mental state, the State had 
to demonstrate that defendant was aware of but consciously 
disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the gun was 
loaded and that attempting to decock it while pointing it in the 
general direction of a nearby person could result in serious 
injury to that person. Further, the State had to show that the 
risk was of such a nature and degree that disregarding it 
amounted to a gross deviation from the standard of care an 
ordinary person in defendant's position would have exercised. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (1999) . The determination of whether 
8 
defendant acted reckless 
province of the jury. £3 
ly lies, of course, within the exclusive 
bate v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 454 (Utah 
1986). Here, the jury was presented with competent evidence of 
defendant' s recklessness). 
First, the record il 's replete with evidence that defendant 
should never be carried 
knew of the risks inherent in handling firearms. Defendant 
himself testified that ne had been around guns his whole life, 
that he had taken gun safety classes, and that he knew all the 
basic rules of gun safety (R. 90: 149-50). He knew that a gun 
around loaded (Id. at 150). Further, 
defendant was fully awaire that pulling the trigger of a loaded 
gun would cause a bullet to fire and that a person in the line of 
fire would sustain serious bodily injury as a result (Id. at 150-
51) . 
Second, the evidence demonstrates that defendant consciously 
disregarded the risk by carrying a firearm he knew was loaded in 
his truck and, subsequently, by reloading the gun and then 
with one hand in close proximity to three 
other people. After unloading the gun and offering it to Nichol, 
defendant consciously chose to replace the magazine in the gun 
and then pull the slide back, knowing that this action would load 
a bullet into the chamber. He then returned the slide to the 
forward position (R. 9D : 62, 63, 70, 152-53, 158). Further, 
defendant testified th(at he knew the proper two-handed method for 
attempting to decock iti 
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decockmg a gun (Id. at 145) . And he conceded that he was not 
using this method when he pulled the trigger and the gun fired 
(Id. at 157). Defendant's gun safety instructor testified that 
he taught that the safest direction in which to point a gun was 
up because "ricochets will hurt more people than a bullet coming 
down"(R. 90: 132). Contrary to this teaching, defendant 
testified that he pointed the gun down when he unsuccessfully 
tried to lower the hammer (Id. at 154-55). Also contrary to what 
he had been taught and claimed to know, defendant conceded that 
he pointed the loaded gun in the direction of another person when 
he pulled the trigger (Id.). Defendant thus made a series of 
conscious and volitional choices, all of which disregarded the 
substantial risks inherent in handling a deadly weapon and which 
ultimately resulted in serious injury to Lindsay Moore. 
Finally, the State amply demonstrated that defendant's 
conduct constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care 
an ordinary person in defendant's position would have exercised. 
See State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1981)(exploring 
parameters of "gross deviation" and concluding that the 
divergence must be "extreme"). The certified state firearms 
instructor testified that the State of Utah standard of care for 
an ordinary person handling a gun calls for compliance with three 
fundamental safety rules: 1) always keep your gun pointed in a 
safe direction; 2) always keep your finger off the trigger until 
10 
you are ready to shoot; ind 3) always keep your gun unloaded 
until you are ready to uie it (R. 90: 116-17, 124). Plainly, by 
pulling the trigger on a loaded gun pointed downwards with three 
other people in close proximity, defendant grossly violated the 
very essence of Utah's standard of care, as embodied in the three 
fundamental rules of safe gun handling. 
Under the record facts of this case, the jury had sufficient 
evidence before it to support a conclusion that defendant acted 
recklessly. Consequentl(y, where defendant has offered no reason 
's belief in the evidence supporting the 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction for aggravated assault. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^b_ day of July, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
to second-guess the jury| 
verdict, his conviction 
^fU>U^L^ 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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